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LET THE SELLER BEWARE: MONEY
LAUNDERING, MERCHANTS AND 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1956, 1957
"Riches are for spending," wrote Francis Bacon.' Bacon could
not have imagined the enormous riches generated by illegal drug
trafficking and the difficulty drug dealers have in spending such
sums.' Because the proceeds of drug sales are "dirty," they cannot
be spent until they are "washed" to appear legitimate. Without
washing, government authorities can link illegal funds to their
owner, making the owner liable for income taxes, prosecution and
forfeitures This washing of illegal monies, called money launder-
ing, is big business and is one of the largest problems currently
facing law enforcement. 4
The federal government has attacked money laundering in
different ways, beginning indirectly by imposing statutory reporting
requirements.° The Bank Secrecy Act made failure to report certain
transactions a crime, although large cash transactions were not
themselves illegal.° Statutory loopholes and mixed judicial interpre-
tation of the statute' led to the Money Laundering Control Act of
1986 ("MLCA"), which sought to close the loopholes and to make
money laundering itself a criminal act.° Finally, Congress passed
the Money Laundering Prosecution Improvements Act as part of
1 FRANCIS BACON, Of Expence, in THE ESSAYES OR COUNSELS, CIVILL AND MORALL 87, 87
(Michael Kiernan ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1985) (1625).
2 In 1990 the Federal Bureau of Investigation estimated that the revenues from drug
trafficking totaled $300 billion worldwide, $100 billion of which was from trafficking in the
United States. Carl P. Florez & Bernadette Boyce, Laundering Drug Money, FBI L. ENFORCE-
MENT BULL., Apr. 1990, at 22, 23. The Department of Justice noted that this totals almost
two percent of the gross national product and is larger than the entire U.S. automobile
market. Jonathan Marshall, Untaxable Billions, S.F. CutoN., July 28, 1991, at 13.
H.R. REP. No. 746, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1986). As noted by the Department of the
Treasury, willful violations of the reporting or money laundering laws can result in criminal
and civil penalties and forfeitures. DEPT OF THE TREASURY, THE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
OF TIIE BANK SECRECY ACT AND SECTION 60501 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 1 (December
1991 Report to the Congress).
4 H.R. REP. No. 746, supra note 3, at 16.
5 See Sarah N. Welling, Smuifs, Money Laundering, and the Federal Criminal Law: The Crime
of Structuring Transactions, 41 FLA. L. REV. 287, 288-89, 292 (1989); see also 31 U.S.C.A.
§§ 5311-5324 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
6 Welling, supra note 5, at 294.
7 Id. at 298, 303.
5 1d. at 289; see also 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1956-1957 (West Supp. 1991); 31 U.S.C.A. 5324
(West Supp. 1991).
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the Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. 9 The 1988 provisions
expanded the definition of "financial institution" to encompass,
among others, car, plane and boat dealers, and persons involved in
real estate closings." Thus the 1988 changes made the previously
enacted reporting requirements applicable to certain merchants and
also made those merchants subject to charges of money launder-
ing. "
This note analyzes the money laundering statutes and the types
of prosecutions brought under them, addressing why a particular
section, 18 U.S.C. § 1957, has not been used as often as its coun-
terpart, 18 U.S.C. § 1956. Section I examines the development of
money laundering legislation, including the rationales and concerns
behind it. 12 Section II describes the types of cases prosecuted under
the legislation, noting changes in the types of persons prosecuted
for money laundering." Section III examines the intended range
of application of the two primary money laundering statutes, and
the paucity of cases brought under section 1957.' 4 Section III also
analyzes some of the arguments against increased use of section
1957 and posits that they are not persuasive." The note concludes
that section 1957 should be used against merchants more often than
it is now, particularly when the section 1956 elements may be dif-
ficult to prove.
I. LEGISLATION AGAINST MONEY LAUNDERING
A. The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 16
Prior to the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 ("BSA"), legislation did
not prohibit money laundering because the government viewed
g 18 U.S.C.A. 1956 (West Supp. 1991).
10 31 U.S.C.A. § 5312(a)(2)(T).-(U). The definition of "financial institution" already in-
cluded dealers in precious metals, stones or jewels. Id. at § 5312(a)(2)(N).
" See § 5312(a)(2)(N). Title 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1956(a)(1) and (a)(3) prohibit certain financial
transactions that involve "the use of a financial institution which is engaged in, or the activities
of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce in any way or degree." 18 U.S.C.A.
1956(c)(4)(B) (West Supp. 1991). Because the law now considers certain types of retail
businesses to be financial institutions, transactions with them would be subject to the money
laundering prohibitions of § 1956. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 5312 (a)(2)(T)—(U).
12 See infra notes 16-56 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 57-173 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 178-208 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 209-270 and accompanying text.
c° Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508,84
Stat. 1118 (1970) (current version at 31 U.S.C.A; §§ 5311-5324 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991)).
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laundering as tangential to the underlying crime that generated the
money. 17 The BSA highlighted this view in its statement of purpose,
indicating that the financial transactions reported would shed light
on criminal activity. 18 The BSA's accompanying Department of
Treasury regulations required financial institutions to file a Cur-
rency Transaction Report ("CTR") for each transaction in currency
over $10,000.' 9 The BSA made failure to report such a transaction
illega1. 2°
Several federal appellate decisions made clear that there was
an exploitable loophole in the BSA's reporting requirements. 2 ' Be-
cause the reporting requirements applied only to currency trans-
actions of at least $10,000, the practice of "structuring" allowed
individuals to arrange their transactions so that each was less than
$10,000. 22 Individuals known as "smurfs" provided the structuring
service by engaging in multiple banking transactions for those who
needed to launder money but did not want the transactions to be
reported. 23 Some United States circuit courts of appeals reversed
convictions of defendants who structured their transactions to avoid
a CTR filing, holding that the BSA and relevant regulations did not
give fair warning that it was illegal to structure transactions to avoid
11 See Mark R. Irvine & Daniel R. King, Comment, The Money Laundering Control Act of
1986: Tainted Money and the Criminal Defense Lawyer, 19 PAC. L.J. 171, 172 (1987).
18 Title 31 U.S.C.A. § 5311 states, "It is the purpose of this subchapter ... to require
certain reports or records where they have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or
regulatory investigations or proceedings."
19 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (1988). The form is Treasury Form 4789 (Currency Transaction
Report). Welling, supra note 5, at 340. The constitutionality of the BSA was questioned in
California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 25 (1974). The Supreme Court, in a decision
by Justice Rehnquist, affirmed the constitutionality of the Act. See id. at 77.
Welling, supra note 5, at 294.
21 See, e.g., United States v. Mastronardo, 849 F.2d 799, 802 (3rd Cir. 1988) (no provision
in the law made it a crime for an individual to structure transactions); United States v. Varbel,
780 F.2d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 1986) (structuring by an individual not prohibited by the statute);
United States v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676, 681 (1st Cir. 1985) (nothing in the law said that an
individual's structured transaction was illegal). But see, e.g., United States v. Cook, 745 F.2d
1311, 1314-15 (10th Cir. 1984) (reporting requirements apply to an individual's conduct),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1220 (1985).
22 Welling, supra note 5, at 296, 297 n.58.
w Id. at 297. These operatives became known as "smurfs" because they, like the popular
cartoon characters of the same time, were seemingly everywhere. Id.
As an example of a typical structuring transaction, imagine a person who wishes to
deposit $50,000 of dirty cash into a bank account. Making the deposit in a lump sum would
trigger a urR filing by the bank, which might capture the attention of revenue or law
enforcement agents. To avoid having a CTR filed, a "smurf" would go to six branches of a
bank and make deposits of less than $10,000 at each one. Because none of the transactions
exceed $10,000, a CTR would not be filed.
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the reporting requirements. 24 Congress criticized such decisions and
later legislatively overturned them. 25
B. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 26
The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 ("MLCA") estab-
lished distinct money laundering offenses. 27 In addition, the MLCA
closed the structuring loophole in the reporting statute. 28 The
change made it a crime to structure transactions for the purpose of
avoiding reporting requirements. 29
The money laundering offenses in the MLCA are twofold. 3°
First, section 1956 prohibits an individual's involvement in a finan-
cial transaction when the individual knows that the property in-
volved in the transaction represents the proceeds of specified un-
lawful activity ("SUA"). 31 Further, the individual must engage in the
Mastronardo, 849 F.2d at 804; see also Varbel, 780 F.2d at 761-62. The Mastronardo court
noted that the First, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals would overturn
convictions for activities such as those in the Mastronardo case, while the Second, Fourth and
Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals had each upheld convictions for similar activities. Mastron-
ardo, 849 F.2d at 804.
25 G. Richard Strafer, Money Laundering: The Crime of the '90's, 27 Am. CIOM. L. REV. 149,
161 (1989); see also S. REP. No. 433, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1986); H.R. REP. No. 746,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1986).
26 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 981-982, 1956, 1957 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991); 31 U.S.C.A. § 5324
(West Supp. 1991).
22
 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1956-1957.
25
 31 U.S.C.A. 5324. The statute states:
No person shall for the purpose of evading the reporting requirements of
section 5313(a) with respect to such transaction —
(1) cause or attempt to cause a domestic financial institution to fail to file a
report required under section 5313(a);
(2) cause or attempt to cause a domestic financial institution to file a report
required under section 5313(a) that contains a material omission or misstate-
ment of fact; or
(3) structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to structure or assist in
structuring, any transaction with one or more domestic financial institutions.
Id. This statute became known as the "anti-smurfing statute," Welling, supra note 5, at 304.
The statute suggests that there is no legitimate reason to keep large transactions secret, and
so there is no legitimate reason to structure transactions. See id. at 338.
29
 31 U.S.C.A. 5324.
'" See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1956-1957.
3 ' § 1956(a). The SUAs, applicable both to § 1956 and § 1957, are numerous and varied.
§§ 1956(c)(7), 1957(f)(3). The statutes incorporate by reference offenses listed as racketeering
activities in 18 U.S.C.A. 1961(1). 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1956(c)(7), 1957(0(3). Racketeering
activities include "murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing
in obscene matter, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs." 18 U.S.C.A. 1961(1)
(West 1984 & Supp. 1991). Other SUAs include: acts constituting a continuing criminal
enterprise; offenses against a foreign nation involving manufacture, importation, sale or
July 1992]
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transaction with either the intent to promote the carrying on of
SUA, or with the knowledge that the purpose of the transaction is
either to avoid a reporting requirement or to conceal the nature,
location, source, ownership or control of SUA proceeds."
Second, section 1957 prohibits an individual from engaging or
attempting to engage in a monetary transaction involving property
valued at more than $10,000 when the individual knows that the
property is derived from SUA." A monetary transaction is defined
in the statute as a "deposit, withdrawal, transfer, or exchange, in or
affecting interstate or foreign commerce, of funds . . . by, through,
or to a financial institution."" Under section 1957, therefore, a
merchant is not criminally liable for receiving proceeds of SUA as
payment for a sale, but is liable for using those proceeds in a
distribution of controlled substances; and offenses under a wide range of federal statutes.
1956(c)(7).
" 1956(a). Section 1956(a)(1) also includes the intent to engage in tax evasion or tax
fraud. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii). The statute states, in pertinent part:
(a)(1) Whoever, 'knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction
represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts
to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of
specified unlawful activity —
(A) (i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful
activity; or
(ii) with intent to ... [violate] section 7201 or 7206 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986; or
(B)knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part —
(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the own-
ership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or
(ii)to avoid a transaction reporting requirement 	 . ,
shall be sentenced .	 .
(2) Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers [or attempts such] a monetary
instrument or funds from a place in the United States to or through a place
outside the United States or to a place in the United States from or through a
place outside the United States —
(A)with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity;
or
(B)knowing that the . funds involved . . . represent the proceeds of some
form of unlawful activity and knowing that such transportation is designed
. —
(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the own-
ership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or
(ii)to avoid a transaction reporting requirement .. .
shall be sentenced ..
18 U.S.C.A. 1956(a)(1), (a)(2).
§ 1957. The statute states, in pertinent part: "(a) Whoever ... knowingly engages or
attempts to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property that is of a value
greater than 110,000 and is derived from specified unlawful activity, shall be punished as
provided in subsection (b)." Id.
34 18 U.S.C.A. § 1957(f)(1).
846	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 33:841
financial transaction." In practice, this element will be satisfied after
the sale because a section 1957 transaction must involve property
of a minimum value of $10,000. The merchant or business receiving
that large sum will have to do something with it, such as depositing
it into a financial institution. 36
Although both sections prohibit certain transactions involving
criminally derived proceeds, there are major differences between
the sections. The greatest difference is the requirement that an
individual prosecuted• under section 1956 must engage in the trans-
action with the intent to promote the carrying on of SUA or with
the knowledge that the transaction's purpose is to conceal the nature
of the proceeds or to avoid a reporting requirement. 37 Section 1957
requires no such intent or knowledge as to the transaction's pur-
pose." Rather, section 1957 requires only that the individual has
engaged in a monetary transaction with property known to be de-
rived from SUA and valued at more than $10,000.39 This required
minimum value is another difference between the two statutes, as
section 1956 has no such requirement. 4° Finally, the penalties under
section 1956 are more severe than those under section 19574' To-
gether, sections 1956 and 1957 make it a crime to conduct business
with, or perform a financial transaction for, anyone who derives
their money from SUAs if the person conducting the transaction
knows it involves SUA proceeds. 42
35 Eugene R. Gaetke & Sarah N. Welling, Money Laundering and Lawyers 4 (Feb. 21,
1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Boston College Law Review).
" Id, at n.17. As one prosecutor pointed out, a businessperson receiving that kind of
money would not stuff it into a mattress. Telephone Interview with Jeff Lindy, Assistant U.S.
Attorney, E.D. Pa. (Mar. 5, 1992) (the views expressed are those of Mr. Lindy alone and do
not reflect those of the Office of the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
or the U.S. Department of Justice).
" 18 U.S.C.A. 1956(a). Section 1956 also includes as a prohibited transaction purpose
the intent to engage in tax violations. Id.
35 See 1957.
" Id.
40 See 1956.
4 ' §§ 1956 (a)(1)—(2), 1957 (b)(1)—(2). Conviction under § 1956 carries a sentence of
imprisonment for not more than 20 years and/or a fine of not more than $500,000 or twice
the value of the property involved in the transaction, whichever is greater. § 1956(a)(1)—(2).
Section 1957 carries with it a penalty of imprisonment for not more than 10 years and/or a
fine of not more than twice the amount of the criminally derived property involved in the
transaction. § 1957(6)(1)—(2). Violations of §§ 1956 and 1957 may also subject property
involved in the violation to civil or criminal forfeiture. 18 U.S.C.A. §4 981-982 (West 1983
& Supp. 1992).
42 John K. Villa, A Critical View of Bank Secrecy Act Enforcement and the Money Laundering
Statutes, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 489, 497 (1988).
July 19921
	
MONEY LAUNDERING	 847
The money laundering laws as passed in 1986 prompted two
specific concerns. The first was that a criminal defense lawyer could
be liable under section 1957 if he or she accepted fees in excess of
$10,000 to defend an accused drug trafficker, and then deposited
such fees in a bank account." The second concern was that the
wording of section 1956 prohibited the use of government sting
operations." As explained by a representative of the Department
of Justice, section 1956 requires that the financial transaction must
in fact involve the use of SUA proceeds.'" If the government were
conducting an undercover sting operation, the proceeds would not
actually derive from SUA, because the government was not really
involved in an unlawful activity to generate the funds." At least
one defendant, charged with violating section 1956(a)(2)(B), tried
unsuccessfully to capitalize on this paradox. 47 Congress addressed
both of these concerns in 1988 legislation amending the MLCA.48
C. Money Laundering Prosecution Improvements Act49
Passed as part of the 1988 Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act, the
Money Laundering Prosecution Improvements Act made some sig-
nificant changes to the government's efforts to combat money laun-
dering. 5° First, it expanded the BSA's definition of "financial insti-
tution" to include automobile, airplane and boat dealerships,
persons engaged in real estate closings and the United States Postal
Service." Further, the Secretary of the Treasury has the authority
to designate as financial institutions other businesses whose activities
" Irvine & King, supra note 17, at 171.
44 Strafer, supra note 25, at 186 (citing U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, HANDBOOK ON THE ANTI-
DRUG ABUSE ACT OF 1986, at 68). The Department of Justice warned against using sting
operations in enforcing section 1956. Id.
45 Money Laundering Control Act Amendments of 1988: Hearing Before the Howe Comm. on
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1988) (statement of Victoria
Toensing).
45 Id.
41 But see United States v. Parramore, 720 F. Supp. 799, 800 (N.D. Cal. 1989). The
defendant invoked the impossibility defense and asserted that the proceeds he was accused
of attempting to launder were not in fact drug proceeds because the "trafficker" with whom
he allegedly conspired was really a government agent. Id. The court denied the defendant's
motion to dismiss the indictment. Id.
'" 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(a)(3), 1957(f)(1).
49 Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4354-59,
4378 (1988) (current version at 18 U.S.C.A, § 1956(a)(3), 1957(f)(1) (West Supp. 1991)).
5°
 Patrick T. O'Brien, Tracking Narco-Dollars: The Evolution of a Potent Weapon in the Drug
War, 21 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 637, 666-67 (1990).
5L 31 U.S.C.A. § 5312(a)(2)(T)—(V) (West 1983 Sc Supp. 1991).
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are related to those listed , or whose cash transactions have a high
degree of usefulness in criminal matters. 52
 A proscribed transaction
with one of the newly-designated financial institutions, then, would
be money laundering.53
 The second change was that section 1956
explicitly allowed the use of sting operations." The last major
change in the 1988 Act was to exempt payment of attorneys' fees
for criminal defense from the definition of a prohibited transac-
tion. 55
 Although there have been minor additions to the money
laundering statutes since 1988, Congress has passed no major
money laundering bills since then. 56
II. PROSECUTING UNDER THE STATUTES
Money laundering has traditionally involved hiding illegal pro-
ceeds by reinvesting them. 57
 Such reinvestment could be in the drug
52
 31 U.S.C.A. 5312(a)(2) at (X)—(Y). These businesses' cash transactions are considered
useful because knowledge of them can lead to cases involving money laundering, drug
trafficking and unreported income. See DWI' OF THE TREASURY, supra note 3, at 3. The
money laundering statutes both state that the term 'financial institution" has the definition
given the term under 31 U.S.C.A. § 5312(a)(2). 18 U.S.C.A. $$ 1956(c)(6), 1957(f)(1).
§§ 1956(c)(4)(13), 1957(f)(1), The money laundering statutes prohibit certain transac-
tions, which are defined in part as involving the use of a financial institution. Id.
" § 1956(a)(3). The subsection states in pertinent part:
(a)(3).Whoever, with the intent —
(A) to promote the carrying on of (SUM;
(B) to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control
of property believed to be the proceeds of [SUA]; or
(C) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement . . .
conducts or attempts to conduct a financial transaction involving property
represented by a law enforcement officer to 6e the proceeds of [SUA) . . .
Id. (emphasis added).
1957(f)(1). The statute states: "the term 'monetary transaction' . . . does not include
any transaction necessary to preserve a person's right to representation as guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment to the Constitution." Id. The Amendment guarantees "(On all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Not all transactions with an attorney are exempted, of
course—only those involving the attorney's work on his or her client's criminal charges. Sarah
N. Welling, 'Transaction' Law Dangerous to Many, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT, May 1991, at 1.
Furthermore, because the right to counsel does not attach until after indictment, fees paid
by a client involved in SUA while the client is merely under investigation, but not yet indicted,
could expose the client's attorney to liability under fi 1957. Id. Department of Justice internal
guidelines indicate that the government will not prosecute attorneys for taking fees derived
from criminal activities unless the attorney actually knew that the payment derived from
criminal activity. See id. The actual knowledge must come from sources other than confidential
communications with the client or the attorney's own efforts while representing the client.
See id.
" Money Laundering Bill Once Again Delayed in Congress, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT, Dec.
1991, at 8. In 1990, for example, felony violations of certain environmental statutes were
added to the list of SUAs. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(c)(7)(E) (West 1984 & Supp. 1991). Congress
had not passed a major money laundering bill as of April 1992,
57 Telephone Interview with Jeff Lindy, supra note 36 ( Jan. 9, 1992). This type of
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trafficking operation that generated the proceeds, in secret accounts
overseas or in legitimate business and real estate ventures.° An-
other, newer aspect of laundering involves not hiding or investing
proceeds or transferring them offshore, but rather, using the illicit
proceeds for consumption of items Like homes and cars. 59 Individ-
uals who launder money through the purchase of consumer goods
are liable under the money laundering statutes.° The government
has prosecuted not only those who make and spend dirty money—
the customers—but also those who take dirty money—the mer-
chants. 61
A. Spending Dirty Money: The Customers
A person spending dirty money on a car, vacation home, jew-
elry or boat often has one concern not shared by the typical con-
sumer: he or she does not want the transaction to come to the
attention of the authorities. 62 Thus the purchaser often tries to
conceal the source and nature of his or her funds or to ensure that
the seller will not report the transaction.° In addition, the purchaser
sometimes buys items necessary for the customer to continue to
carry on his or her illicit business, such as beepers or paging de-
vices. 64 These seemingly routine transactions therefore have char-
acteristics indicative of money laundering—efforts to conceal the
source of the funds or purchase of an item needed to promote the
illicit business. These characteristics are, as discussed above, ele-
ments of a section 1956 violation.°
In successfully prosecuting individuals under section 1956 for
laundering their dirty money through purchases, the government
laundering typically involves shell corporations, foreign bank accounts and use of electronic
money transfers. See Jonathan Beaty & Richard Hornik, A Torrent of Dirty Dollars, TIME, Dec.
18, 1989, at 50, 53, 55.
38 Beaty and Hornik, supra note 57, at 53.
39 See id. at 55. The authors described the growth of this laundering, through car dealers
and other entrepreneurs, as an "explosion." Id. The Department of Justice estimates that
about twenty percent of narcotics proceeds are spent on the flashy accoutrements of drug
dealers' lifestyles such as cars, jewelry, speedboats and the like. Allan Dodds Frank, See No
Evil, FORBES, Oct. 6, 1986, at 38, 40.
do 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1956-1957.
61 See infra notes 73-173 and accompanying text for a discussion of customer and
merchant prosecutions.
62
 Harry Jaffe, Dirty Money, WASHINGTONIAN, Jan. 1992, at 59, 60.
65 See infra note 90 and accompanying text for a discussion of the concealment of a
buyer's funds.
84 See infra note 76 and accompanying text for a discussion of a purchase involving items
necessary to promote the SUA.
65 See supra note 32 and accompanying text for a discussion of the elements of an 18
U.S.C. § 1956 violation.
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must prove that the defendant intended the transaction to be for
the purpose of promoting the continuation of SUA. 66 Alternatively,
the government can prove that the defendant knew the transaction
Was for the purpose of concealing the source of the proceeds or
avoiding reporting requirements. 67 The cases discussed below illus-
trate how different transactions are made for the different section
1956 purposes. 68 One case shows how a defendant can engage in
transactions both with the intent to promote the carrying on of SUA
and with the knowledge that the purpose of the transaction is to
conceal the source of the SUA proceeds. 69 Another shows that
defendants can be liable even if they themselves did not intend that
the transaction be for the purpose of concealing the nature of the
proceeds, as long as they have knowledge that that is the purpose. 7°
Finally, two companion cases provide an example of how intent or
knowledge as to the transaction's purpose can be a difficult element
to prove. 7 '
Section 1956 requires the government to prove that the defen-
dant intended the transaction to promote the carrying on of SUA
or to prove that the defendant knew the transaction was for the
purpose of avoiding reporting requirements or concealing the na-
ture of the SUA proceeds. 72 In the 1991 case United States v. Jackson,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the conviction of the Reverend Joseph Davis under section 1956(a),
holding that Davis intended the transactions to promote the carry-
ing on of SUA and that Davis knew the purpose of the transactions
was to conceal the source of his dirty cash. 73 Defendant Davis, a
preacher, in an effort, perhaps, to serve very different flocks, also
ran two crack houses, depositing some of the cash proceeds into
" 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i).
" § 1956(B).
" See infra notes 73-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of different § 1956
transaction purposes.
69 United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832 (7th Cir. 1991). See infra notes 73-82 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the case.
" United States v. Lee, 886 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1989).
71 United States v. Sanders, 929 F.2d 1466 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 143 (1991);
United States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d 940 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 142 (1991).
72
 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(a).
75 935 F.2d at 841. Davis was convicted of violating § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) (intent to promote
the carrying on of SUA) and § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (knowing the transaction's purpose was to
conceal or disguise the source of the funds). Jackson, 935 F.2d at 841. The government must
prove only one of the purposes specified in § 1956 in order to prove a § 1956 violation. Id.
at 842.
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bank accounts in his church's name. 74 A jury convicted Davis on
three counts of money laundering under section 1956, based on
checks he had written on church accounts to beeper and telephone
services, to his landlord and to a savings and loan in return for
cash.75
The court stated that to violate section 1956 Davis had to do
more than simply conduct the transactions using dirty cash. 76 Ac-
cording to the court, he either must have intended the transactions
to be for the purpose of promoting SUA, or he must have had
knowledge that the purpose of the transactions was to avoid re-
porting requirements or to conceal the source of the SUA pro-
ceeds. 77 The Jackson court agreed that Davis's checks to a beeper
service were intended to promote his drug activities." The court
therefore held that Davis had violated section 1956. 79
The court did not, however, agree that the checks to a cellular
phone service, Davis's landlord and the savings and loan for cash,
were made for the purpose of promoting drug activity. 80 The pur-
pose of those checks, the court held, was to conceal or disguise the
source of Davis's cash.' Thus Davis also violated section 1956 with
those transactions, which were for a different transaction purpose
than were the transactions with the beeper service. 82
In the Jackson case, the court held that some of the defendant's
transactions were for the purpose of concealing or disguising the
source of his dirty money, thereby violating section 1956(a)(1)(B). 85
Unlike section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), which requires that the defendant
have the specific intent to promote the carrying on of SUA, section
1956(a)(1)(B) requires only that the defendant know that the pur-
pose of the transaction is to conceal the source, nature or location
of the SUA proceeds, or that the purpose is to avoid reporting
mandates. 84 Subsection B means that the customer making the
74 Id. at 836.
I' Id. at 837-38.
76 See 61. at 840.
77 Id. at 842.
78 Id. at 841. A witness testified that Davis gave beepers to his drug runners so that he
could contact them with instructions about when to make pickups of cash from the crack
houses. Id.
"Id. To be exact, Davis violated § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i). Id.
8" Id.
8 ' Id.
82 Id. These transactions violated § 1956(a)(l)(B)(i). Id.
es
	 , 935 F.2d at 841.
m 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(a)( 1 )(A)(i), (B).
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transaction need not necessarily have the intent to conceal the
source of the proceeds used in the transaction as long as the cus-
tomer knows that this is the intent of the person who arranged the
transaction. 85
One case that illustrates the point that the person who arranges
the transaction for a prohibited purpose need not be the person
who carried out the transaction, is the 1989 case United States v.
Lee. 86 In Lee, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit affirmed Lance Robinson's conviction and sentence for
money laundering under section 1956 after Robinson purchased a
house for co-defendant Kevin Paige. 87 Paige offered to pay Robin-
son if Robinson would purchase a house for him. 88 Robinson did
so, knowing that the money for the purchase came from the pro-
ceeds of Paige's drug sales. 89 Robinson also appeared to know that
the purpose of the transaction was to conceal Paige as the source
of the purchase money." This case, then, shows that even if Rob-
inson himself did not intend the transaction to conceal SUA pro-
ceeds, he had the requisite knowledge of Paige's intent and was
thereby liable under the statute. 9 '
Regardless of whether a defendant charged under section 1956
has the intent or the knowledge of intent of the transaction's pur-
pose, the transaction must still be conducted for one of the purposes
specified in section 1956: to promote the carrying on of SUA, to
conceal the source of the SUA proceeds or to avoid a reporting
requirement. 92 The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit emphasized the importance of the transaction's purpose as
an element of a section 1956 violation in the 1991 companion cases
United States v. Sanders and United Slates v. Sanders." In both cases,
the court reversed the Sanderses' convictions for money laundering
85 See Strafer, supra note 25, at 162.
" 886 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1989).
" Id. at 1003, 1004. Paige operated several crack houses. Id. at 1000.
'8 Id. at 1003.
89 Id. It is a necessary element of a § 1956 violation that the defendant know the property
involved in the transaction represents (or is represented to be, in the case of a sting operation)
the proceeds of SUA. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956.
99 See Lee, 886 F.2d at 1003. Robinson secured a loan and bought the house in his name,
pretending that he would rent the house to Paige. Id.
" Id. Paige was also convicted of money laundering under § 1956. Id. at 1000.
92
 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956.
" 929 F.2d 1466, 1472 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 143 (1991) (defendant was
Renee Armstrong Sanders); 928 F.2d 940, 946 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 142 (1991).
(defendant was Johnny Lee Sanders, husband of Renee Armstrong Sanders).
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because the government did not sufficiently prove that the defen-
dants' purpose in purchasing two cars was to conceal the source of
the purchase money."
The Sanderses' money laundering convictions under section
1956 were based on the purchase of two cars with the alleged
proceeds from heroin distribution. 95 In the first purchase, the Sand-
erses bought a Volvo. 98 The Sanderses also bought a Lincoln, which
they titled in their daughter's name. 97
In reversing the Sanderses' convictions, the Tenth Circuit held
that the Sanderses did not attempt to conceal their identity as the
cars' purchasers and therefore did not violate section 1956.98 The
Sanderses were both present when they bought the Volvo, and both
were known to the salesperson. 99 The court described the Lincoln
purchase as a closer case for a money laundering conviction because
the car was titled in the Sanderses' daughter's name.' 00 The court
noted, though, that the daughter was present at the car lot during
the purchase and shared the same surname as the defendants,
which would make obvious her connection to them.'°'
The government did not counter the defendants' arguments
but argued instead that section 1956 should be interpreted to cover
all such transactions that involve the use of SUA proceeds. 102 The
court expressly rejected this argument.'" Interpreting section 1956
to encompass all transactions with dirty money, rather than limiting
the statute's reach to transactions for one of the purposes mentioned
in the statute, the court said, would turn the money laundering
statute into a money spending statute, something Congress did not
intend.'" The Sanders cases are important for the court's emphasis
that section 1956 was intended to prohibit not ordinary transactions
95 Sanders, 929 F.2d at 1473; Sanders, 928 F.2d at 946.
95 929 F.2d at 1468, 1471; 928 F.2d at 942, 944.
" 929 F.2d at 1471; 928 F.2d at 946.
55 929 F.2d at 1472; 928 F.2d at 946. Johnny Sanders testified that the car was titled in
his daughter's name for insurance purposes. 929 F.2d at 1471; 928 F.2d at 945.
w 929 F.2d at 1472; 928 F.2d at 946.
" 929 F.2d at 1471; 928 F.2d at 946.
'"° 929 F.2d at 1472; 928 F.2d at 946.
101 929 F.2d at 1471; 928 F.2d at 945. In addition, both the Volvo and the Lincoln were
"conspicuously" used by the defendants, making their connection to the cars a simple matter
for law enforcement officers investigating the defendant's alleged drug dealing. See 929 F.2d
at 1472; 928 F.2d at 945-46.
'° 929 F.2d at 1472; 928 F.2d at 945.
1 °3 929 F.2d at 1472; 928 F.2d at 946.
1 " 929 F.2d at 1472 & n.2; 928 F.2d at 946, 946 n.3.
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with dirty money, but transactions for the purpose of concealing or
disguising the dirty money and its source.'° 5
Thus, the defendants convicted of money laundering under
section 1956 in the Jackson and Lee cases all did more than merely
spend dirty money.'" They violated section 1956 by engaging in
the transactions with either the intent to promote the carrying on
of SUA, or with the knowledge that the purpose of the transaction
was to conceal the source of the SUA proceeds or to avoid a re-
porting requirement. 117 Proving the defendant's intent or knowl-
edge of the transaction's purpose is a requisite part of a section
1956 prosecution for money laundering, as shown in the reversal
of the Sanderses' convictions.'" Without this element, section 1956's
focus would be more on the activity of spending money than on
the activity of laundering money.'"
B. Accepting Dirty Money: The Merchants
The cases described above, involving customers who laundered
their dirty money by spending it, focused on the individuals actually
involved in the SUA that generated the proceeds used in the trans-
action.''° There were, of course, other people involved in the trans-
actions, namely the merchants who sold the goods." 1 With the 1988
inclusion of sellers of cars, planes and boats, along with persons
involved in real estate closings, in the definition of "financial insti-
tution," these merchants became liable under sections 1956 and
1957,112
The merchants prosecuted thus far, with one exception, have
all been charged under section 1956. 113
 In such cases, the prose-
1 °5 Set Sanders, 929 F.2d at 1472; Sanders, 928 F.2d at 946.
'°°.See supra notes 73-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Jackson and Lee
cases.
107 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956 (West Supp. 1991).
10" See Sanders, 929 F.2d at 1472; Sanders, 928 F.2d at 946.
109 Sanders, 929 F.2d at 1472; Sanders, 928 F.2d at 946.
"° See supra notes 73-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of specific cases. In
United States v. Lee, 886 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1989), the defendant was not the person directly
involved in the SUA, but rather was designated by that person to engage in the laundering
transaction. Id. at 1003.
"' See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 837 (7th Cir. 1991) (provider of
cellular telephone and paging services); Sanders, 929 F.2d at 1471 (salesperson at car deal-
ership).
112
 31 U.S.C.A. 5312(a)(2)(T)—(U) (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
"3 See infra notes 123-73. Ellen Campbell, a real estate agent, was charged under both
$ 1956 and § 1957. United States v. Campbell, 777 F. Supp. 1259, 1260 (W.D.N.C. 1991).
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cution must prove three elements." 4 First, the proceeds used in the
transaction must be, or must be represented as, SUA proceeds." 5
Second, the merchant must know that the proceeds are derived
from SUA."6 Third, the merchant must intend the transaction to
be for the purpose of promoting the carrying on of SUA or the
merchant must have the knowledge that the transaction's purpose
is to avoid reporting requirements or to conceal the source or nature
of the SUA proceeds." 7
The following cases provide examples of the types of cases
brought against merchants." 8 They illustrate that the merchants
often not only know that the intent of the transactions is to conceal
the source or ownership of SUA proceeds, but also that they actively
participate in the concealment. k 9 The cases also give examples of
the various methods by which merchants launder the SUA pro-
ceeds. 12° Finally, two cases show that the government may have
difficulty proving the merchant knows that the transaction involves
SUA proceeds, and that the concept of willful blindness may not
be of much use as a basis of proof.' 2 '
Three money laundering cases against merchants illustrate the
extent to which the merchants not only know the purpose of the
transaction, but utilize various methods to help the customer accom-
plish that purpose.' 22 In June 1990, in one of the earliest merchant
money laundering cases, the government indicted three Los An-
geles car dealers, owners of AMS Auto Sales, under section 1956. 128
Within five months all the defendants had pled guilty.' 24 The car
dealers admitted that most of their customers were drug dealers
who needed to dispose of conspicuous cash so as to avoid govern-
ment suspicion.' 25 The ,defendants laundered their customers'
114 18 U,S.C.A. § 1956.
118 § 1956 (a)(1), (a)(3).
un § 1956 (a)(1).
117 § 1956 (a).
118 See infra notes 123-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
"9 See infra notes 123-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of merchant partici-
pation.
' 29 See infra notes 123-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of these methods.
121 See infra notes 150-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases in which the
government argued willful blindness.
122 See infra notes 123-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
123 See L.A. Car Dealership Seized, Money Laundering Charged, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT,
July 1990, at 6 (citing Case No. 90-415 (C.D. Cal. 1991)).
124 L.A. Car Dealers Plead Guilty in Sting, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT, Nov. 1990, at 3.
128 L.A. Car Dealership Seized, Money Laundering Charged, supra note 123, at 6. It is not
surprising that the SUA was the narcotics trade. See Nathanial Sheppard Jr., Drug-Money
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money using a variety of methods. 126 Such methods included using
a fake buyer's name when recording the sale, bringing in a third
party to buy the car for the drug dealer, and putting false liens on
the car to keep the car's title in the dealership's name.' 27 The
defendants knew that the purpose of the transactions was to conceal
the source of the customers' cash, as shown by the methods the
merchants designed to do just that.' 28 The defendants, then, not
only knew that the money involved was derived from SUA and that
the purpose of the car purchases was to conceal the ownership of
the proceeds, but they themselves assisted in the concealment.' 29
A second case that shows that merchants oftën know the in-
tended purpose of the laundering transaction and also actively ad-
vance that purpose was brought in October 1990 in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York against five car deal-
erships.'" Three of the five dealers pled guilty to laundering money
in violation of section I956.'" Undercover investigators found that
almost all the dealers were willing to accept cash payments from
supposed drug dealers without filing the required IRS Form
8300032 All but one dealership agreed to use false names in titling
the cars.'" Moreover, there was no doubt that the car dealers knew
Launderers Cleaning up with Cash, Cm. 	 Oct. 23, 1989, at 1. Drug sales account for the
biggest portion of the so-called "underground economy," which means that drug money will
likely be the biggest portion of laundering activity as well. See id.
"s L.A. Car Dealership Seized, Money Laundering Charged, supra note 123, at 6.
1 " Id. The last method, putting a false lien on the car to retain title in the dealership,
serves two purposes. See Car Leases Gave 'Seizure Protection,' MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT, June
1991, at 1. It makes it more difficult for law enforcement officers to trace the car back to
the drug dealer and, more importantly, it protects the car from being forfeited in the event
that the drug dealer is prosecuted for his or her drug trafficking. See id.
In See L.A. Car Dealership Seized, Money Laundering Charged, supra note 123, at 6.
129 Id.
I " Five N Jr. New Car Dealers Charged, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT, Nov. 1990, at 1. The
government charged Mercedes-Benz Manhattan, Inc., Manhattan Nissan, Inc., Manhattan
Mazda, Gidron Ford and Bronx Acura. Id.
151 Auto Dealers Guilty, Pay $342,000, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT, June 1991, at 3.
'" Five N.Y. New Car Dealers Charged, supra note 130, at 1. The Bank Secrecy Act ("BSA")
defines car dealerships, among other businesses, as "financial institutions." 31 U.S.C.A.
§ 5311-5324 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991). The BSA's regulations govern how the law is
administered. Businesses named in the BSA as financial institutions, but not named as such
in the BSA regulations, do not have to file CTRs, also designated as IRS Form 4789. Sarah
N. Welling, Rules Modify BSA Definition of 'Financial Institution,' MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT,
July 1991, at 6. They are required, however, to file similar IRS Form 8300s for cash trans-
actions of over $10,000. Id. Car dealers must use Form 8300 to report transactions. Id.
'" Five N.Y. New Car Dealers Charged, supra note 130, at I. The names used included
Magic Johnson and Ray Charles. Id. Insurance agents were also implicated in the case, as
they fabricated drivers' licenses and insurance papers to match the false names. Id.
July 1992]
	
MONEY LAUNDERING	 857
where the cash came from, as undercover agents told the sales-
people that the purchase money was derived from drug sales.'"
The car dealers knew that the purpose of the transactions was to
avoid reporting requirements or to conceal the source of the SUA
proceeds.'" The car dealers' knowledge is shown by the ingenious
ways they found to disguise the identities of their supposed drug-
dealing customers. 136
Finally, a third case illustrates that car dealers are not the only
merchants laundering money.'"' Retailers in other industries also
launder money through methods adaptable to their particular
trade.' 58 A federal jury in Washington, D.C. found Charles Wynn,
owner of the Linea Pitti clothing store, guilty of money laundering
in October 1991.' 39 Wynn laundered money for drug kingpin Ray-
ful Edmond III and Edmond's associate, Tony Lewis. 140 Wynn's
methods of laundering included falsifying sales records to keep the
drug dealers' names off the invoices and putting Lewis on the
payroll even though he never worked at the store."'
The three cases discussed above illustrate that a number of
merchants in different industries know that their customers' in-
tended purpose for their purchasing transactions is to avoid re-
porting requirements or to conceal the source of the illegal pro-
"4 Five N.Y. New Car Dealers Charged, supra note 130, at I. The government may find it
easier to prove its case when an investigation involves undercover agents posing as drug
dealers, rather than relying on the testimony of actual drug dealers to make the case against
merchants, Telephone Interview with Christopher Mead, Assistant U.S. Attorney, D. Md.
(Feb. 11, 1992) (the comments expressed are the remarks of Mr. Mead alone and do not
reflect those of the Office of the U.S. Attorney for the District of Maryland or the U.S.
Department of Justice). juries may prove reluctant to take the word of bona fide drug dealers
against the merchants, whereas undercover FBI or Drug Enforcement Agency agents are
more credible witnesses. Id.
05 Five N.Y. New Car Dealers Charged, supra note 130, at 1.
3J9 Id. See supra note 133 and accompanying text for a discussion of the methods used.
139 See Clothier Convicted in Washington, D.C., MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT, Dec. 1991, at 5
(citing No. 91:90 (D.D.C. 1991) (defendant owned clothing store)).
"9 See id.; Jewelers Convicted in Los Angeles, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT, Jan. 1991, at 2
(four jewelers and bullion dealers convicted of money laundering).
"9 Tracy Thompson, Ex-Clothier in Georgetown Convicted of Money Laundering, WASH. POST,
Oct. 16, 1991, at D5.
140 1d. In 1989, Rayful Edmond, who ran the largest cocaine sales organization in the
District of Columbia, was convicted of drug distribution. Id. Tony Lewis and other members
of the Edmond gang were also convicted of drug distribution. Id.
141 Clothier Convicted in Washington, D.C., MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT, Dec. 1991, at 5.
Wynn also bought over $200,000 worth of cars for Lewis, putting the cars in his (Wynn's)
name to conceal Lewis's drug .money. Id. Interestingly, the government considered prose-
cuting the car dealership that sold the cars to Wynn, but concluded that it was unable to
build a case against the dealership. See Jaffe, supra note 62, at 139.
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ceeds."2
 In addition, the merchants know that the money used
comes from illegal activities.'' Thus these merchants are in viola-
tion of section 1956.' 44
To prove a violation of either section 1956 or section 1957, the
government must show that the defendant knew the property used
in a financial transaction represented the proceeds of illegal activ-
ity.' 45
 This knowledge was evident in the AMS Auto Sales, New
York car dealership and Charles Wynn cases. 146 This is not always
the case, however, and the government has tried to use the concept
of willful blindness to establish a defendant's knowledge. 147 A per-
son is willfully blind if he or she deliberately avoids affirmative
knowledge and, after his or her suspicions are aroused, deliberately
omits making further inquiries because of a wish to remain in
ignorance. "8
 The government has had difficulty in proving knowl-
edge by showing willful blindness.' 49
One 1990 case illustrates the difficulty of proving that mer-
chants knew the transaction involved SUA proceeds. In this case,
the federal government prosecuted a car dealership, Capital Im-
ports, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland."° A
jury acquitted three car dealers of money laundering after the
prosecution failed to convince the jury that the defendants knew
they were dealing with drug dealers.' 5 '
142 See supra notes 128, 135, 140 and accompanying text.
143 See supra notes 125, 134, 140 and accompanying text,
144 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956 (West Supp. 1991).
145
 18 U.S.C.A. §1 1956(a), 1957(a).
' 4° See supra notes 125, 134, 140. One set of defendants admitted that most of their
customers were drug dealers; undercover agents told other defendants that they were making
the purchases with drug money; and the last defendant knew that his customer was the head
of a drug organization in the city. Id.
147 See infra notes 150-73.
' 4 ' United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976).
One commentator has criticized the use of the willful blindness concept in money laundering
prosecutions because, he asserts, it results in shifting the burden to the defendant to prove
that he or she was acting reasonably and without knowledge. See Strafer, supra note 25, at
169. Strafer argues that under the willful blindness standard the government need only show
that the defendant has had business dealings with someone identified as a criminal. Id. The
defendant would then have to rebut the concomitant presumption of guilt. See id. Despite
Strafer's misgivings, willful blindness has not been a boon to the government in money
laundering prosecutions, as shown by the cases discussed infra notes 150-73.
' 49 See infra notes 150-73.
' 50 See Jury Acquits Car Dealers on Money Laundering Charges, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT,
Jan. 1991, at 3 (citing No. JH 89-0380 (D. Md. 1990)).
151 Id. Although the government used undercover agents to develop the case, it also
presented actual drug dealers as witnesses at trial. Id. The jury apparently had difficulty
believing the testimony of drug dealers and was of the impression that the government had
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The government proceeded on the theory of willful blindness
in order to prove that the car dealers knew the transaction involved
the proceeds of SUA.' 52 Undercover agents brought packages
wrapped in tape to the car dealers and implied that they held
cocaine. 153 In addition, the agents used coded language implying
that they were drug dealers.' 54 The agents never actually said the
word "drugs," however, leading the jury to reject the argument that
the defendants knew they were conducting business transactions
with alleged SUA proceeds.'" Further, the jury did not accept the
theory of willful blindness to impute the requisite knowledge to the
defendants. ' 5"
In the 1991 case United States v. Campbell, the government again
argued willful blindness to show the defendant's knowledge that
the transaction involved SUA proceeds.' 57 The U.S. District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina set aside the jury's verdict
convicting a real estate agent of section 1956 and section 1957
money laundering.'" The court found that Ellen Campbell did not
know that part of her client's purchase money for a house was
derived from drug activity, thereby making impossible her section
1956 and section 1957 convictions. 15"
Ellen Campbell was a licensed real estate agent in North Car-
olina who assisted Mark Lawing, a drug dealer, in his purchase of
a lakeside vacation home. "'t' Lawing often wore gold jewelry and
traveled to his appointments with Campbell in a Porsche equipped
with a cellular telephone.'"' On one of his visits to Campbell, Lawing
made deals with drug traffickers in order to prosecute car dealers. Id. As the prosecuting
attorney surmised, juries will accept the word of drug dealers in cases against drug dealers,
but not necessarily in cases against legitimate businesspeople. Telephone Interview wills
Christopher Mead, supra note 134.
' Sr Telephone Interview with Christopher Mead, supra note 134.
'" Jury Acquits Car Dealers on Money Laundering Charges, supra note 150, at 3.
" Id.
155 See id.
rso See Telephone Interview with Christopher Mead, supra note 134. As Mead explained,
willful blindness is a way of communicating to a jury that common sense, coupled with a
suspicious transaction, would lead to the conclusion that the defendants were aware of the
SUA nature of the transaction funds. Id: In this case, the jury did not make that conclusion.
Id.
L" 777 F. Supp. 1259, 1264 (W.D.N.C. 1991). The case against Campbell resulted in the
first conviction of a real estate agent. "Willful Blindness" Prosecutions Are Dealt Setback, MONEY
LAUNDERING ALERT, Nov. 1991, at 1.
I" Campbell, 777 F. Supp. at 1260, 1270.
Id. at 1267-68.
mo Id, at 1260-6 I .
R" Id. at 1261.
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demonstrated his ability to buy a house by showing her $20,000 in
cash.' 62
 When Lawing found a house he wanted to buy, he was
unable to secure a loan for the contract price of $182,500.' 6' In-
stead, he asked the sellers to lower the contract price by $60,000
and accept that amount in cash under the table. 16 ' According to a
colleague of Campbell's, Campbell mentioned that the cash may
have been drug money but that she, Campbell, did not care where
it came from.' 65
Although the jury convicted Campbell, the court granted
Campbell's motion for a judgment of acquittal because it found
problematic the jury's findings that Campbell knew the purchase
funds were the proceeds of SUA.' 66
 The government argued that
Campbell was willfully blind to the fact that the proceeds used in
the transaction were derived from SUA. 167 Had Campbell not in-
tentionally averted her attention from the facts, the government
explained, it would have been obvious to her that Lawing was a
drug dealer.I 68
The court rejected the willful blindness argument, however,
asserting that the only testimony concerning Campbell's knowledge
was based on Lawing's appearance and lifestyle.' 69 Lawing owned
an expensive new boat, told Campbell of his trips to Las Vegas,
drove a red Porsche and wore gold jewelry.' 7° While the court
described Lawing as a spendthrift playboy whose image might gar-
ner attention, the court wrote that Lawing's uncommon lifestyle and
habits were not so unusual that his outward appearance alone would
indicate he was a drug dealer.'" Further, Lawing told Campbell
that he operated or participated in an auto repair shop and a
restaurant, both high cash volume businesses.' 72 Thus the court
held that Campbell had not violated either section 1956 or section
162 Id.
162 Id.
' 64 Id. Lawing told Campbell that he wanted the cash payment hidden because he was
lying to his parents about the price of the house. Id. at 1262.
'" Id. at 1262. The statement was questionable, as the colleague could not recall when
Campbell made the statement and had previously testified before a grand jury that she could
not recall if Campbell had ever made a statement about drug money. Id. at 1266-67.
'"/d. at 1263.
'67 Id. at 1264.
1" Id.
169 Id. at 1265.
175 Id. at 1261, 1265, 1266.
"I Id. at 1265-66.
172 Id. at 1266.
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1957, because there was inadequate proof that Campbell knew the
transaction funds were derived from SUA.'"
The cases prosecuted against money laundering merchants il-
lustrate three points. First, the methods used by merchants to laun-
der money are varied and include using fake buyers' names to
record sales, putting false liens on cars and falsifying payroll rec-
ords. 14 Second, these actions by merchants show not only that
merchants often know that the purpose of the transactions is to
conceal the source of SUA proceeds or to avoid reporting require-
ments, but also that they actively participate in accomplishing these
purposes. 15 Third, it is not always easy for the government to prove
that a merchant knew the property used in a transaction was derived
from illegal activity, an element necessary for either section 1956
or section 1957 convictions. 175 The concept of willful blindness has
furnished insufficient proof to convince a jury or judge that the
defendant merchants had such knowledge.'"
III. SECTION 1957 Is RARELY USED AGAINST MERCHANTS IN
COMPARISON TO SECTION 1956: THE MISGUIDED REASONS FOR
THAT RELUCTANCE
A. The Government's Intent to Apply the Statutes Beyond Those Who
Make Dirty Money
There is no doubt that both Congress and the Executive Branch
intended sections 1956 and 1957, the money laundering statutes,
175 Id. at 1267-68. In addition, the government was unable to prove, as required by
§ 1956, that the purpose of the transaction was to conceal the source of the transaction funds.
Id. at 1264. As the court noted, the location, source, ownership and control of the money
were clearly in the person of Lawing; the question was whether the transaction was designed
to conceal the nature of the money. Id, at 1263 & n.5. Although Lawing did not title the
house in his own name, the court found that titling the house in his parents' name was hardly
an attempt at concealment, for he could be readily identified with them. Id. at 1264. In
addition, the court pointed out, Lawing did not conceal his identity in the transaction: he
was present at every consequential meeting concerning the sale of the house; he personally
brought the $60,000 to Campbell's office; and the sellers counted the money in his presence.
Id. The government has filed an appeal on the reversal of conviction under 1957. Telephone
Interview with Frank Whitney, Assistant U.S. Attorney, W.D.N.C. (Dec. 20, 1991) (the com-
ments expressed are the remarks of Mr. Whitney alone and do not reflect those of the Office
of the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of North Carolina or the U.S. Department of
Justice).
' 74 See supra notes 127, 133, 141 and accompanying text.
ITh See supra note 142.
176 See supra notes 155, 159 and accompanying text.
144 See supra notes 156 and 159 and accompanying text.
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to apply both to those who make dirty money and to those who
take dirty money. 18 Congressional reports and testimony at hear-
ings indicate that the legislature was well aware that money laun-
dering is a necessary facet of the drug trade, and that the purchase
of cars, real estate and jewelry is an integral part of money laun-
dering. 179 In the Executive Branch, the 1991 creation of a money
laundering unit indicated the administration's understanding that
the statutes applied to a wider range of defendants than simply
those who amassed dirty money through illegal activity.' 80
When the money laundering statutes were first discussed before
passage of the 1986 Money Laundering Control Act, Congress ad-
dressed the problem of merchants who do business with customers
spending dirty cash.' 8 ' Congress recognized that money laundering
need not only involve institutions such as banks, and that other,
non-financial businesses were also being used extensively in laun-
dering schemes.' 82 Congress specifically mentioned jewelers, auto-
mobile dealers and real estate agents as those who would be guilty
of money laundering if they knew their transactions were part of a
customer's plan to conceal criminally derived property.' 83 As one
congressperson remarked, it was unacceptable for a person to en-
gage in transactions with dirty money and try to justify it by assert-
ing that he or she had not committed the crime that generated the
money.' 84
One member of Congress posed an example of a merchant
who accepted dirty money. He asked hypothetically whether a local
grocer who was aware of a customer's reputation for drug dealing
would be guilty of money laundering if the grocer took the custom-
er's money for five pounds of hamburger and later deposited it in
' 79 E.g., H.R. REP. No. 855, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 13 (1986).
' 79 See, e.g., Money Laundering: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Super-
vision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1989) thereinafter Money Laundering] (comment of Rep. Saxton) (witness
had pointed out how important the aspect of money laundering is in the drug business);
H.R. REP. No. 855, supra note 178, at 15 (money laundering schemes need not involve
financial institutions such as banks and non-banking transactions are used extensively as parts
of money laundering schemes).
199
 See Justice Department Creates Money Laundering Unit, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT, Jan.
1991, at 1.
' 8 ' See infra notes 182-93 and accompanying text.
152
 H.R. REP. No. 855, supra note 178, at 15.
195 Id.
194 See id. at 13. Congressman Shaw declared, "I am sick and tired of watching people
sit back and say, '. my hands are clean even though I know the money is dirty I am
handling.'" Id.
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a bank.' 85 In the legislator's understanding of the statutes under
discussion, the grocer would be liable if he or she knew the customer
had no legitimate source of income.' 86 Similarly, the grocer would
also be liable if he or she had direct knowledge that the customer
was involved in illegal activity, such as seeing the customer selling
drugs before coming into the store. 187
While the members were correct in their understanding that a
grocer could be liable under the money laundering statutes, the
grocer would not be subject to prosecution under the particular
hypothetical described. Under section 1956, the purpose of the
transaction would have to be to promote the carrying on of the
drug dealing, to conceal the source of the drug proceeds, or to
avoid reporting requirements.' 88 Because the hypothetical drug
dealer ostensibly made the purchase of hamburger in person and
did not seek to use a false name, for example, it is unlikely a court
would find this element of section 1956 fulfilled. As for liability
under section 1957, the statute would not apply to this transaction
because the purchase of five pounds of hamburger is not a trans-
action in the amount of $10,000 or more.'"
Like the House, the Senate also considered merchants' involve-
ment in money laundering schemes in debating the 1986 Money
Laundering Control Act.'" The Senate discussed merchants in re-
gard to the concept of using willful blindness to show how a defen-
dant could be willfully blind to the fact that a transaction involved
188 Id. at 13-14. Congressman McCollum asked the question and proceeded to answer
it. Id.
"8 Id. at 14. While this may have been Congress's understanding in 1986, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit subsequently noted in United States v. Black-
mun, 904 F.2d 1250 (8th Cir. 1990), that the government cannot rely "exclusively" on the lack
of a legitimate source of income to impute that a defendant was using proceeds from unlawful
activity. Id. at 1257 (court's emphasis).
"7 H.R. REP. No. 855, supra note 178, at 14.
1"8 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956 (West Supp. 1991).
in 18 U.S.C.A. § 1957 (West Supp. 1991). Congress returned to the issue of money
laundering merchants in the years after passage of the MLCA when considering both amend-
ments to the Act and the efficacy of the laws. See, e.g., Business Community's Compliance with
Federal Money Laundering Statutes: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm,
on Ways and Means, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1990) [hereinafter Compliance]. Congressman
Rangel stated, "those people behind the counter . . . are just as much violators and criminals
... as the hoodlums on the street." Id. at 6; See also Money Laundering, supra note 179, at 205
(Congressman Torres asked what could be done to deal with the problem of laundering
money through jewelry stores, car dealerships and other businesses with high cash volumes).
i°u See S. REP. No. 433, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986) (participation in money laundering
schemes spans the spectrum from individuals to legitimate businesses to organized crime).
864	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 33:841
specified unlawful activity ("SUA") proceeds.' 9 ' According to the
Senators, a currency exchanger engaged in a large cash transaction
with a known drug dealer, who accepts a commission far above the
market rate, would have the requisite knowledge or "willful blind-
ness" necessary for a section 1956 violation. 192 In contrast, the Sen-
ate pointed out, a car dealer who sells a car at market prices to a
person only suspected of drug involvement, without more, would
not have violated the law.' 93
Like the Legislative Branch, the Executive Branch also signaled
its intention to apply the statutes more widely to reach merchants
when it established the new Money Laundering Section at the De-
partment of Justice.'" The Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Section
had previously handled money laundering. 195 Making enforcement
of money laundering laws the focus of a new section implied that
the laws have a broader application than only the prosecution of
narcotics dealers. 196 Even before the establishment of the new sec-
tion at the Department of Justice, administration officials had tes-
tified before Congress as to merchant involvement in money laun-
dering.' 97 One federal prosecutor asserts that many federal law
enforcement agencies and prosecutors now spend as much time
investigating where drug money goes as where the drugs came
from.' 98
The legislators who drafted sections 1956 and 1957 intended
the laws to apply both to those who spend dirty money and to those
who accept it in transactions. 199 The Executive Branch has also
focused on the different types of launderers, looking beyond those
191 Id. at 9-10.
192 Id. at 10.
' 93 1d.
' 91 See Justice Department Creates Money Laundering Unit, supra note 180, at 1.
195 See id.
196 1d,
197 E.g., Money Laundering: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1989) [hereinafter Laundering] (official of the U.S. Customs
Service asserted that many types of businesses are suited to money laundering); MLCA of
1986 and the Regulations Implementing the BSA: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial
Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and
Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 105 (1987) [hereinafter MLCA] (William Weld, then
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, stated that it was hoped that 1957 would
eliminate the large market in luxury items used by procurers of illegal money).
'" Frank D. Whitney, The Nuts and Bolts of Federal Money Laundering and Currency
Reporting Statutes and Asset Forfeiture Laws and Procedure 1 (paper for Continuing Legal
Education seminar, on file with the Boston College Law Review).
199 See supra notes 182-93 and accompanying text.
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who actually generate the illegal proceeds. 20° Despite the dual weap-
ons of sections 1956 and 1957 and their possible range of money
laundering defendants, prosecutors have used the two laws in
widely disparate fashion. 20 ' As of the middle of 1990, the govern-
ment had filed charges against 302 people under section 1956, while
charging only 14 people under section 1957. 2°2
B. Section 1957, Broader than Section 1956, Can Be Interpreted as a
Money Spending Statule203
That section 1957 is used so rarely in comparison to section
1956 is curious, considering that commentators have described sec-
tion 1957 as a broader, more widely applicable statute than section
1956. 204 The district court in the two Sanders cases did not accept
the government's argument that section 1956 should apply to all
transactions, ordinary on their face, that involve the proceeds of
SUA. 2°5 Such an interpretation, the court said, would turn section
1956, a money laundering statute, into a money spending statute. 206
While the required element of section 1956 regarding the pur-
pose of the transaction indicates that section 1956 is indeed directed
at money laundering and not money spending, such an interpre-
tation of section 1957 is by no means certain. Authorities have read
this section simply as prohibiting monetary transactions in property
derived from criminal activity or engaging in financial transactions
20° See supra notes 194-198 and accompanying text.
201 See Welling, supra note 55, at I.
202 Compliance, supra note 189, at 208.
20' Calling § 1957 a "money spending" statute does not imply that its use is limited to
those who spend dirty money. Rather, the designation suggests the major elemental difference
between $ 1956 and § 1957. The former requires that the purpose of the transaction be to
promote the criminal activity or to conceal the source of the dirty funds. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956.
The latter does not require this element; engaging in a transaction of more than $10,000 of
known dirty proceeds is sufficient to violate the statute even without any attempt at conceal-
ment. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1957.
404
 Charles Thelen Plombeck, Confidentiality and Disclosure: The Money Laundering Control
Act of 1986 and Banking Secrecy, 22 INT'L LAW. 69, 79 (1988) (stating that $ 1957 has "potentially
the broadest application"); Telephone Interview with Sarah Welling, Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of Kentucky at Lexington ( Jan. 7, 1992) ($ 1957 is a broader statute). Professor
Welling has written about money laundering several times and is on the Editorial Board of
Money Laundering Alert.
2°5 United States v. Sanders, 929 F.2d 1466, 1472 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 143
(1991); United States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d 940, 946 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 142
(1991). See supra notes 93-104 and accompanying text for a discussion of the cases.
'"{' Sanders, 929 F.2d at 1472; Sanders, 928 F.2d at 946.
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with proceeds generated from specified crimes. 207 Indeed, at least
one federal prosecutor and one money laundering expert assert
that section 1957 is a money spending statute. 2"
C. Why Isn't Section 1957 Being Used?: Practicality and Policy Argue
for Its Use Against Merchants
Because section 1957 is a broader statute than is section 1956,
and because it encompasses money spending, though not money
laundering, it is well suited for use against merchants who know-
ingly accept dirty money. Yet it is rarely used for that purpose,
begging the question, why not? Some of the reasons given for the
infrequent use of section 1957 have been purely practical. Others
are based on the policies of the proper role of merchants in fighting
drugs and money laundering and the risk of adverse public reac-
tion. The concerns raised by these policies, however, are unpersu-
asive. At the very least, there is an argument for increased use of
section 1957 in order to test the validity of the arguments against
using the statute more often.
1. Practicality
There are several practical reasons why prosecutors use section
1956 more often than section 1957. The Justice Department pro-
vides prosecutors with more training and seminars on how to pros-
ecute under section 1956. 209 In addition, section 1956 may provide
a greater incentive for use because of its greater penalties. The
maximum prison sentence under section 1956 is twice that of section
1957. 21 ° Further, because prosecutors have discretion to choose
which offense to charge, they are likely to charge the offense that
2" Plombeck, supra note 206, at 79; Welling, supra note 55, at 1. It is important to keep
in mind, however, that § 1957 requires that the transaction involve property derived from
SUA of value greater than $10,000. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1957(a) (West Supp. 1991).
202 Telephone Interview with Sarah Welling, supra note 204; Telephone Interview with
Frank Whitney, supra note 173.
209
 Telephone Interview with Stephen Patrick O'Meara, Assistant U.S. Attorney, S.D.
Iowa (Dec. 31, 1991) (the views expressed are those of Mr. O'Meara alone and do not reflect
those of the Office of the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Iowa or the U.S.
Department of Justice).
210
 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1956(a), 1957(b). A § 1956 conviction carries a possible sentence of
up to 20 years imprisonment and/or a fine of $500,000 or twice the value of the property
involved in the transaction, whichever is greater. § 1956(a). A § 1957 conviction carries a
possible sentence of up to 10 years imprisonment and/or a fine of not more than twice the
amount of the criminally derived property involved in the transaction. § 1957(b).
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offers the greatest penalties. 2 " Thus section 1956 may be the start-
ing point more often than section 1957, even though it is the more
difficult offense to prove. 212
While there are practical explanations for the current non-use
of section 1957 relative to section 1956, they are not enough to
prevent the use of a powerful weapon in the government's arsenal.
If training focuses more on section 1956, the obvious remedy to
prosecutors' unfamiliarity with section 1957 is additional training
and seminars in the use of that section.
There are cases in which the evidence may not be sufficient to
prove the additional section 1956 element of the purpose of the
transaction, much less the merchant's knowledge of that purpose. 2 ' 5
In those cases, it is wiser, perhaps, to prosecute under section 1957,
despite its lesser penalty, than to risk losing the case under section
1956. The Campbell case provides a good example of when a section
1957 case may exist and a section 1956 case does not. 214 There, the
court reversed the defendant's convictions under both section 1956
and section 1957 on the ground that the defendant did not know
the cash involved in the purchase of a house was derived from
SUA. 215 The court further held, with regard to the section 1956
conviction, that there was insufficient evidence as to the purpose of
the transaction and the defendant's knowledge of the purpose. 216
While the government may have conceded that the defendant did
not know the purpose of the transaction, it is appealing the section
1957 decision, hoping to prove that the defendant did know the
funds were derived from SUA.217 Thus even if the crucial "purpose"
element of section 1956 is gone, there may still be a violation under
section 1957.
There are cases, then, where section 1957 is a more appropriate
charge than section 1956. A prime candidate for a section 1957
211 Telephone Interview with Stephen Patrick O'Meara, supra note 209.
212 Section 1956 is more difficult to prove because the government must show that the
defendant knew the funds were the proceeds of SUA (also a required element of § 1957).
In addition, however, the government must show that the defendant either intended the
transaction to promote the carrying on of the SUA or that the defendant knew the trans-
action's purpose was concealment of the location, nature or ownership of the funds or
avoidance of reporting requirements. § 1956.
215 United States v. Campbell, 777 F. Supp. 1259 (W.D.N.C. 1991).
234 See supra notes 157-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the case.
2111 Campbell, 777 F. Supp. at 1267. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
216 777 F. Supp at 1267. See supra note 173.
"'Telephone Interview with Frank D. Whitney, supra note 173. While the government
did not expressly concede the lack of a § 1956 purpose, it has appealed only the § 1957
reversal.
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prosecution would be a merchant who knows that a customer is
using dirty money in a purchase, but where the transaction lacks
the required section 1956 element of intending the continuation of
SUA, concealing the SUA proceeds or avoiding reporting require-
ments. A customer who asks a merchant to use a blatantly false
name on a new car title is signaling that the transaction is intended
for the purpose of concealing the customer's identity, and the mer-
chant who engages in the transaction could likely be convicted
under section 1956. Where the title is in a name different from the
customer's, yet is not obviously misleading, as in the Campbell case
where the customer titled the house in his parents' name, then the
government may not be able to prove that the purpose of the
transaction was to conceal the illegal source of the funds. 218 In such
a case, if the merchant knows the funds are dirty but does not
overtly attempt to conceal their source or to avoid reporting the
transaction, then it would be wiser for the government to prosecute
under section 1957.
2. The Role of Merchants in Fighting Money Laundering
In attempting to fight the drug and crime war on all fronts,
Congress, by passing the money laundering laws, may have drafted
merchants as unwilling deputies.219 Until 1986, taking and exchang-
ing dirty money was not a criminal act as long as merchants fulfilled
reporting requirements. 22° By 1986, growing concern over drug
trafficking and drug use prompted Congress to recognize that in
addition to those who supply and sell drugs, those who launder the
proceeds and sell the high-priced trophies of the trade such as cars
and jewelry are also part of the drug problem. 2"
21 " Campbell, 777 F. Supp. at 1264.
219 At the outset of this discussion, it may seem tempting to look to the Prohibition era
for analogous provisions. The search is not a fruitful one, however, largely because the crime
of money laundering did not exist in the Prohibition era. Prosecutions against merchants
focused largely on their actions in supplying distillers with the ingredients needed to man-
ufacture intoxicating liquor and often proceeded on the theory of conspiracy. See, e.g., United
States v. Wilson, 59 F.2d 97, 98 (W.D. Wash. 1932) (defendant guilty of conspiracy in the
illicit manufacture and sale of alcoholic liquor for furnishing bootlegger with yeast, sugar
and materials to build a still). Such situations might be analogous to the present day merchant
who supplies the chemicals needed to manufacture methamphetamine, but any liability in
that instance is different from liability for accepting and laundering money derived from
the subsequent sale of the methamphetamine.
220 See supra note 17. Prior to the 1970 Bank Secrecy Act, money laundering activities
were not prohibited. Id.
221 H.R. REP. No. 855, supra note 178, at 13 (Congressman Shaw urged, "[t]he only way
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There are two reasons why merchants are in fact proper "de-
puties" whose actions can aid law enforcement and, conversely,
whose actions should make them liable when they contribute to the
problem. There is also a way to prevent merchants from becoming
overprotective and thus unfairly refusing certain customers. First,
the drug problem is huge and money laundering is inextricably
connected to 4.222 Second, many merchants are themselves part of
the money laundering problem, and Congress expressed its belief
that merchants be held criminally liable for engaging in laundering
activity. 223 Finally, there are guidelines that could be implemented
to aid merchants in halting money laundering, while at the same
time preventing legitimate customers from being wrongly refused
service.224
Because of the extent of the drug trafficking industry and the
ties between drug traffickers and merchants, increased enforcement
of the money laundering statutes against merchants will also prove
useful in combatting the traffickers as well. The illegal narcotics
industry is a huge business, worth $100 billion annually in the
United States alone. 225 The industry is linked to money laundering
out of necessity, because a drug trafficker's cash must be laundered
to be of any value to the trafficker. 226 Some estimate that laundering
in certain cities exceeds $3 billion each year. 227 While not all of the
dirty money is spent on consumer items such as cars or motorboats,
enough dirty money enters the legal economy that it is profitable
we will get at this problem is to let the whole community, the whole population, know they
are part of the problem").
422 Money Laundering Legislation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Su-
pervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. I (1990) (Congressman Annunzio observed, "[mioney laundering is
the lifeblood of the drug trade .... You cannot have an illegal drug business without money
laundering").
225 See infra notes 231-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of merchants' flouting
of reporting requirements.
224 See infra notes 236-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of guidelines.
225 Floret & Boyce, supra note 2, at 23.
226 Monty Laundering, supra note 1'79, at 1-2 (Congressman Annunzio pointed out that a
drug dealer's cash is nothing more than pieces of paper until it can be exchanged for bank
credits or goods).
2" See Marshall, supra note 2, at 13. The surplus in a Federal Reserve branch bank is a
good indicator of drug money laundering taking place in that city, because the federal reserve
system usually pays out more cash than it takes in. Id. In Miami, for example, the surplus in
the Federal Reserve's regional bank is almost $5.4 billion. Id. In Los Angeles, the surplus is
$3.4 billion. Id. The Federal Reserve Board reports that of the $245 billion in currency in
circulation, the Board can account for only one dollar in nine. Id. That means the other
eight-ninths are either hidden, overseas or circulating in the underground economy.
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for merchants to accept it despite the risk of prosecution. 228 Because
drug trafficking and money laundering are so closely linked, in-
creased enforcement of reporting and money laundering statutes
will help to identify and later prosecute drug dealers. 229 In addition,
merchants prosecuted for money laundering will sometimes provide
information about their• drug-dealing customers in order to help
their own case.230 •
Merchants should be a part of the law enforcement effort
against money laundering because they are often active participants
in the laundering. It is probably true that some merchants inadver-
tently accept dirty money, unaware of the nature of the money they
are handling. Other merchants, however, far from being neutral in
the drug war, actively participate in laundering drug money and
thus profit from the drug trade. 23 ' Congressional investigators re-
ported that businesses across the country routinely schemed with
customers to avoid reporting requirements. 232 These investigators
approached different types of businesses in nine cities, disguised as
customers who wanted to pay cash for goods over $10,000 without
having the transaction reported. 233 Ninety-six percent of the busi-
nesses contacted were willing to take cash without reporting it. 234
In a 1990 hearing on compliance with the money laundering stat-
utes, Congress found this collaboration between merchants and cash
customers alarming and reiterated its belief that the business com-
munity has a responsibility not to engage in transactions involving
dirty money. 235
229 See, e.g., Jaffe, supra note 62, at 60. In Washington, D.C., for example, as much as $1
billion a year in dirty money is spent locally—and Washington is a smaller market than
Florida, California or New York. Id. A prosecutor in Washington describes merchant involve-
ment as "part of an unholy alliance between business and drug dealers that fuels the fire of
drug trafficking .. . ." Id. at 139.
2" DEPT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 3, at 3 (information in filing reports is extremely
useful in developing cases involving drug trafficking).
"0 E.g., Jaffe, supra note 62, at 138 (government offered clothier Charles Wynn a deal
if he would help them find drug dealers).
231 See supra notes 123-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of merchants who
laundered drug money.
232 Compliance, supra note 189, at 2.
233 Id. at 14. Investigators did not complete the transactions, but merely negotiated for
the items. Id. at 42. Some of the items discussed fur sale included a $73,000 Porsche, a
$17,000 Rolex watch, an $18,000 French armoire and a $15,700 Persian rug. Id. at 3, 27–
28.
2" Id. at 14.
235 /d. at 2-3. ("It is shocking," declared Congressman Pickle, "that businesses are rou-
tinely conniving with customers to violate the law"); id. at 5-6 (Congressman Schulze stated
that although he is opposed to placing unnecessary burdens on legitimate businesspeople,
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Lest increased prosecutions under section 1957 prompt mer-
chants to become overly cautious, there are guidelines that the
government and merchants could implement that would help mer-
chants to identify laundering customers and transactions. Financial
institutions, which are also liable for money laundering and re-
porting lapses, have adopted a "Know Your Customer" standard. 236
According to the American Bankers Association, "Know Your Cus-
tomer" means verifying the business of a new account holder, re-
porting activity disproportionate to the known business and veri-
fying that the customer's identification documents are genuine. 237
Trade associations, such as the National Automobile Dealers Asso-
ciation and the National Association of Realtors, for example, could
assist their members in developing similar, industry-specific stan-
dards. 238 Further, government agencies could inform oft-targeted
industries about what constitutes a suspicious transaction and might
also aid in developing profiles analogous to drug courier profiles
used in airports. 239
Any new guidelines would also address the concern that mer-
chants may begin to rely on racial stereotypes and refuse to deal
with certain customers in an attempt to protect themselves from
criminal liability. Even if the customers are not in fact involved in
any illegal activity, merchants might refuse to conduct business with
them on the basis of misleading or stereotypical characteristics such
as a customer's age, race or manner of dress. Thus, the argument
goes, someone who is merely suspected of criminal involvement—
perhaps because of appearance alone—would find it difficult to
engage in everyday commerce. 24 °
everyone in the business community must do their part to stop the drug and crime problem);
id. at 45 (Congressman Anthony asserted that the business community needs to understand
that they may well be arrested if they help launder dirty money).
2'6 Money Laundering, supra note 179, at 75.
237 Laundering, supra note 197, at 308.
238 The National Association of Realtors noted, for example, that it is not at all routine
for a real estate purchase to be conducted in cash. Telephone Interview with Mary Stark-
Hood, Legal Department of the National Association of Realtors (Feb. 11, 1992). The
National Automobile Dealers Association closely follows enforcement actions and regulations
that affect its members and would likely aid its members in protecting themselves, particularly
because their industry has been frequently linked to money laundering activity. See Car
Dealers Urge Clarify [sic] in Cash Rules, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT, July 1991, at 4.
239 The Department of the Treasury has provided financial institutions with guidelines
as to what constitutes suspicious patterns of transactions. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note
3, at 35. Similarly, the IRS has developed a plan of action to inform vendors of items such
as cars and boats of their statutory responsibility to report currency transactions. Id. at app.
3 at 4.
"0 See Villa, supra note 42, at 500.
872	 BOSTON COI I EGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 33:841
There are two reasons, however, why this argument is unper-
suasive. First, section 1957 requires that the transaction involve
property valued at a minimum of $10,000. 241 Most people's every-
day commerce does not involve transactions in excess of that
amount. Second, professional guidelines for recognizing suspicious
customers and transactions would be based on industry and law
enforcement experience, not on unsavory stereotyping by an indi-
vidual merchant. While there would still be the chance that a mer-
chant might apply the profile in a discriminatory fashion, presum-
ably such a profile would be more accurate than simply a perceived
profile imagined by the single merchant.
There are thus two reasons why merchants should participate
in the efforts against money laundering and should be held crimi-
nally liable under section 1957 if they do not. First, the drug trade
and money laundering services are closely linked, with the latter
supporting the former. Increased enforcement of the money laun-
dering statutes not only would deter money laundering, but might
also have the secondary effect of providing information about drug
trafficking. Second, merchants are not always unwitting participants
in money laundering transactions, but rather knowing and active
participants. Under section 1957 the government has an obligation
to prosecute such merchants. Further, there are ways to aid mer-
chants in detecting unlawful transactions without causing the mer-
chants to refuse legitimate customers. For example, government
agencies and industry trade associations could do more to develop
guidelines and standards to aid in identifying suspicious customers
and questionable transactions so that legitimate customers are not
unfairly hampered in or refused their transactions.
3. Public Perception: Addressing the Fear of Backlash
Perhaps the single greatest factor preventing increased use of
section 1957 against merchants is the fear that public perception
will be negative, thereby endangering support for all attempts to
combat money laundering. 242 Because section 1957 on its face is
241
 18 U.S.C.A. § 1957(a) (West Stipp. 199 1 ).
242 See Michael A. Defeo, Depriving Ina Narcotics Traffickers and Other Organized Criminals
of Illegal Proceeds and Combatting Money Laundering, 18 DEN. J. INT'L L. & Pot.'Y 405, 414
(1990). Mr. Defeo's concern is that money laundering investigations targeting greedy busi-
nesspeople eager to make easy money but not otherwise criminally involved, will lead to a
negative legislative reaction. Id. Such a reaction would endanger all "currency control, asset
tracing, and forfeiture legislation." Id.
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broader in its application than section 1956, the Department of
Justice has been wary of using section 1957 as much, mindful that
the public must perceive prosecutions as reasonable and just. 243
This fear of public backlash against efforts to prosecute all
entities involved in laundering money is valid, but readily mitigated.
First, while there is no documentation of public resistance to such
prosecutions, there are instead indications that the public sees drug
trafficking and its effects on society as one of the major problems
facing the country. 244 Because drug trafficking is closely tied to
money laundering by the traffickers' need to render their illegal
profits usable, there is some indication that the public is as wary of
money launderers as it is of drug dealers.245 Further, businesses
that launder money have an unfair advantage over their law-abiding
competitors, a situation likely to raise the public's ire in difficult
economic times.246
Second, the statutory elements of section 1957 prevent the
government from prosecuting merchants who are unaware of the
source of their customers' cash and merchants who engage in small
transactions."' To be liable under section 1957, a merchant must
know that the property involved in a transaction is derived from
criminal activity."' As shown in the Campbell and Capital Imports
cases, the element of knowledge is not always an easy element to
prove.249 In Campbell, the government was unable to prove that the
243 See MLCA, supra note 197, at 108.
244 E.g., R.W. Apple Jr., White House Race is Recast: No Kremlin to Run Against, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 6, 1992, at AS (graphic showing that for three straight years, from 1988 through 1990,
drugs were identified as the most important problem facing the country); Robert Dvorchak,
'Drug War' Has No Ammunition, Front-Line Troops Complain, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1989, at A2
(National League of Cities spokesman called drugs "far and away the No. 1 issue for our
cities," and a community leader called drugs the "worst crisis to hit America since Pearl
Harbor").
243 See Suzanne Gamboa, Innocent Ties to Drug Dealers Can Hurt, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 18,
1990 (Sun. Preview Ed.), at A19. When U.S. Marshals seized a shopping center because its
owner was a drug trafficker, the shopping center's tenants got the Marshals to issue a
statement saying that their businesses were legitimate and not tied to the drug-dealing
landlord. Id. Some customers told the merchants that if their stores were involved in money
laundering, they would boycott the stores. Id.
246
	
Money, Gray Money, Funny Money: The Many Shades of Dirty Deals, PR NEWSWIRE,
Feb. 4, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, prnews file. A retailer that launders money
has access to a cash flow unavailable to the honest retailer, giving the dishonest merchant an
advantage over his or her competitors. Id.
2" 18 U.S.C.A. § 1957(a) (West Supp. 1991).
24s
249 United States v. Campbell, 777 F. Supp. 1259 (W.D.N.C. 1991); fury Acquits Car Dealers
on Money Laundering Charges, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT, Jan. 1991, at 3 (citing Capital
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defendant knew from her client's lifestyle and appearance that his
funds were derived from drug dealing. 250 In the Capital Imports
case, the undercover customers' display of small wrapped packages
and use of code words did not convince the jury that the car dealers
knew their customers were drug dealers. 251 Further, the statute's
$10,000 minimum threshold means that even if a merchant were
aware of the illegal source of the funds, the merchant would not
be liable under section 1957 if the transaction was for less than this
amount. 252 Thus the government would not prosecute merchants
engaged in everyday, small transactions if, for example, they sold a
bag of groceries or tank of gas to a customer whose funds were
known to be criminally derived.
The concern about public reaction is based on the idea that
there will be an outcry if the government prosecutes an otherwise
honest merchant who accepts dirty money. 253 For example, consider
a car dealer who knows that the customer with cash is involved in
SUA. The customer purchases an automobile for $25,000 and pays
cash, but does not seek to conceal his or her identity as purchaser,
disguise the nature of the funds or avoid reporting of the transac-
tion. Assume also that the car dealer files the proper IRS form. In
such a case, there is no section 1956 violation. 254
If the car dealer has done everything right, the argument goes,
why should he or she be prosecuted under section 1957? The
answer, in short, is that the hypothetical car dealer has not "done
everything right." Knowingly participating in a transaction with
dirty money hardly renders the car dealer blameless. The truly
blameless car dealer is the one who has unwittingly participated in
a transaction with property derived from SUA. A merchant who
lacked that knowledge would not be liable under section 1957. 255
Third, with thoughtful choices about which kinds of cases to
prosecute, the government should be able to convince the public
that the merchants involved are large-scale violators of money laun-
dering laws and thus avoid a backlash against section 1957 prose-
Imports, No. JH 89-0380 (D. Md. 1990)). See supra notes 150-73 and accompanying text
for a discussion of these cases.
2" Campbell, 777 F. Supp. at 1265.
25 ' pay Acquits Dealers of Money Laundering Charges, supra note 150, at 3.
252
 18 U.S.C.A. 1957(a) (West Supp. 1991).
255 Defeo, supra note 242, at 414.
254 18 U.S.C.A. 1956 (West Supp. 1991), Section 1956 requires that the government
prove the transaction was for the purpose of promoting the SUA, concealing the nature of
the proceeds or avoiding reporting requirements. Id.
255
	
1957.
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cutions. Prosecutors could alleviate possible adverse public reaction
by focusing only on merchants who are systematically and repeat-
edly involved in large scale transactions with dirty money. 256 A good
case for section 1957 would involve a merchant who engages in
numerous transactions with dirty money, but who does not under-
take the transactions for one of the purposes that would bring the
transactions under the auspices of section 1956. For example, if a
merchant consistently titles cars in obviously false names, the gov-
ernment could prosecute under section 1956 because the transac-
tion would be for the purpose of concealing the true owner of the
illegal proceeds. 257 Nevertheless, if the car dealer uses names that
are not obviously disguises, such as another family member's name,
then a section 1956 violation is more difficult to prove. 258 Such a
car dealer would be a prime candidate for a section 1957 prosecu-
tion, particularly since savvy money launderers may start to take
advantage of this gray area between a blatantly false name and a
name that provides some protection from identification without
overtly concealing identity. 259
Fear of adverse public reaction to section 1957 prosecutions of
merchants is unwarranted. First, there is evidence that the public is
concerned about drug trafficking and its web of related money
laundering. 2 ° Furthermore, there is some evidence that the public
would not be sympathetic to money laundering merchants. 26 ' Sec-
ond, section 1957 requires that the transaction amount exceed
$10,000 and that there be knowledge that the funds are dirty. 262
Thus, section 1957 provides checks against prosecution of mer-
chants engaged in small, ordinary transactions and against mer-
chants who unwittingly accept tainted money but otherwise comply
with the reporting requirements. 263 Third, a cautious prosecution
25" Merchants in a particular area who are willing to accept dirty money become known
as the merchants to visit if a customer wants to spend cash with no questions asked. See, e.g.,
L.A. Car Dealership Seized, Money Laundering Charged, supra note 123, at 6.
257
	 U.S.C.A. § 1956. For example, some car dealers used the name Magic Johnson
when titling cars. Sec supra note 133, at 1.
256
	 States v. Campbell, 777 F. Supp. 1259, 1264 (W.D.N.C. 1991). The customer
bought a house and titled it in his parents' names, which the court said was insufficient proof
of an intent to conceal the source of the proceeds. Id.
"g As one IRS official remarked, "the government is getting smarter, but so are the
traffickers." Marshall, supra note 2, at 13.
2"" See supra note 244.
2" ' See supra note 245,
2"2 18 U.S.C.A. § 1957(a).
an See id.
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strategy would target only those merchants who engage in repeated
large-scale transactions with dirty money but who manage to avoid
the purpose element of section 1956. For these reasons, there is
little basis to fear a public backlash against section 1957 prosecu-
tions.
4. Congress Advocates Using All Available Weapons Against
Money Laundering
The reluctance of prosecutors to bring section 1957 actions is
surprising, considering that Congress has voiced its support for
using all available statutes against money laundering.264 When pre-
sented with facts and figures about the business community's lack
of compliance with reporting requirements, Congress voiced its
disapproval and urged greater action against violators. 265 In a 1990
oversight hearing concerning enforcement of transaction reporting
laws, one congressman indicated his belief that reporting violations
ought to be more vigorously prosecuted. 266 Considering that the
reporting requirements include transactions in both clean and dirty
money, it is difficult to imagine that Congress would press for
prosecution of reporting violations,267 yet balk at increasing enforce-
ment of laundering laws, such as section 1957, aimed only at dirty
money.
In addition, the Department of Justice has stated its commit-
ment to developing a just and reasonable standard for field prose-
cutors for section 1957 prosecutions. 268 Yet with only 14 individuals
charged under section 1957 as of mid-1990, that standard has not
yet been instituted and prosecutors are not using the statute. 269
It would not take many section 1957 prosecutions to impart
the lesson to merchants that they should not knowingly accept dirty
money. Indeed, one witness testified before Congress that all it
would take to get the attention of the non-reporting community is
264 See, e.g., Money Laundering, supra note 181, at 50 (Congressman Annunzio opined that
the basic money laundering laws are in place and what is needed is to have them enforced).
265 Compliance, supra note 189, at 211 (Congressman Pickle stated that all members were
in agreement that if there has been a reporting violation, then those cases ought to be
prosecuted).
2" Id.
2671d.
266 MLCA, supra note 197, at 108.
269 Compliance, supra note 189, at 208.
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a few publicized enforcement efforts against errant businesses. 27°
The same could be said for section 1957 prosecutions against mer-
chants. A few prosecutions would put money laundering merchants
on notice that their activity must cease. It would also send the
message to legitimate businesspeople not to risk accepting dirty
money.
Congress passed the money laundering statutes with the inten-
tion that they be enforced to their fullest. Increased enforcement
of the money laundering statutes would signal merchant launderers
that they must stop their illegal activity or risk prosecution. In-
creased enforcement would also deter other merchants from enter-
ing the money laundering business.
IV. CONCLUSION
The conception of money laundering has evolved from the
original approach that the underlying criminal activity was the sole
illegal act, to the belief that financial institutions must report certain
transactions, and finally to the current view that money laundering
itself is a serious and distinct crime. With drug trafficking gener-
ating enormous sums of dirty money, law enforcement is concerned
about merchants' involvement with the drug trade. If traffickers
cannot launder their dirty money so as to shield the owner from
investigation and prosecution, or to enable the owner to make ex-
pensive purchases, then there is little incentive to engage in the
activity.
Congress fully intended sections 1956 and 1957 to hold re-
sponsible anyone involved in money laundering, whether a drug
trafficker engaged exclusively in illegal narcotics deals, or a mer-
chant who caters to the drug trade by laundering the traffickers'
money. Whereas prosecutors have used section 1956 aggressively
against merchants in different industries across the country, they
have seldom used section 1957 against anyone and even more rarely
against merchants.
Section 1957 is written more broadly and with elements of
proof different from those of section 1956. Thus the government
has been reluctant to use it, fearing an adverse public reaction if
the prosecutions focused on small merchants whose only crime was
having accepted dirty money. Yet section 1957 generally protects
2" Id. at 120.
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such merchants from prosecution. The elements of the statute are
not easy to prove, particularly the requirement that the defendant
know the property used in a transaction is criminally derived. In
addition, the $10,000 minimum ensures that there will not be a
spate of frivolous cases charged.
Moreover, the public would probably support, as Congress
seems to, increased use of section 1957 against merchants who
accept dirty money. Merchants who knowingly accept dirty money
enable criminal activity to thrive. Considering the ceaselessness of
crime in general and drug trafficking in particular, there is a strong
likelihood that the public would want to deter such merchants. It is
time to hold accountable merchants who profit from the drug trade
and, in turn, make the drug trade possible. Section 1957 is a valu-
able weapon against such persons, and it should be used more often.
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